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SUPERIOR COURT
CRIMINAL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CR-97-388

STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Appellee

/

AUQ 1 '< jÿÿjf
DECISION AND ORDER

v.

E S C ElVED
TERRANCE BRENNAN
Appellant
This matter comes before the court on the appeal of Terrance Brennan from a
judgment of the District Court where he had entered a plea of guilty to a charge of
unauthorized practice of law, Class E, in violation of 4 M.R.S.A. § 807. The appellant
had been disbarred from the practice of law on December 26,1995. The record reflects
that he signed a waiver of his right to counsel on January 13,1997 and entered a plea
of guilty. He was sentenced to six months with all but 30 days suspended and
probation for a period of one year. The transcript of the District Court arraignment
on October 4, 1996, reflects that the appellant entered a plea of not guilty but the
records do not include the court's explanation of rights to those appearing for
arraignment, including the right to a jury trial where the charge could carry a jail
sentence. The defendant did not file a transcript of the "mass arraignment" of
October 4, 1996, nor did he file a transcript of proceedings of January 13.1997.
The appellant contends on appeal that the failure of the court to advise him
of his right to a jury trial requires the setting aside of the conviction. He contends

1

that the "mass arraignment" is not adequate to inform him of his right to a jury trial
and, at oral argument, stated that he was not in the court room when the "mass
arraignment" instructions were given. The State contends that the appeal must fail
because the appellant did not furnish a complete record for appellate review,
1
1*
including the transcript of the "mass arraignment", that the appeal is not timely
since he had not signed the notice of appeal within the time for taking an appeal,
and that his right of appeal has been waived by his plea of guilty.

DISCUSSION

The court does not have a transcript of the January 13, 1997 hearing when the
guilty plea was entered. The court has no way of determining whether he was
informed of his right to a jury trial. The court does not have a transcript of the
District Court's explanation of rights to all persons in court at the arraignment on
October 4, 1996, and therefore has no way of determining whether those present
were informed of their right to a jury trial. The failure to produce all relevant
transcripts for appellate review requires denial of an appeal. State v. Ross, 1997 ME
67 1, 691 A.2d 1253,1254 (Apr.4,1997); State v. Thwing. 487 A.2d 260, 262 (Me. 1985)
A notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. M.R.Crim.P. 49(d);
M.R.Civ.P. 11. The signed notice of appeal must be filed within 20 days of the entry
of judgment. The record in this case reflects that the unsigned notice of appeal of the
appellant was filed February 3, 1997, the defendant was notified that the notice of
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appeal had to be signed, and the signed notice was not filed until February 13, 1997.
A criminal defendant has 20 days after entry of judgment within which to file a
notice of appeal. M.R.Crim. P. 37(c). Failure to meet the deadline is fatal to the
authority of the court to hear the appeal. State v. Pelletier, 636 A.2d 989, 99(Mel994).
1

The appellant's affidavit dated June 2/1997, filed with the court June 3, 1997,
contains as an attachment a document (DCCR-28 (6/90) C) which is a District Court
form advising persons about court procedure and contains a jury trial request. It is
dated November 8, 1996, is signed by the appellant and contains a notation in the
lower right corner to the appellant "Please be advised that your request for jury trial
is being returned beyond the 21 day rule as highlighted." This court can infer from
this document that the appellant had received a notice of his rights at the time of his
arraignment and that he had not filed his request for jury trial within 21 days of his
arraignment.
The right to challenge a guilty plea on direct appeal is limited.

State v.

Blanchard, 409 A.2d 229, 232 n. 1 (Me. 1979). The rationale for this principle is that by
voluntarily pleading guilty, a defendant waives all defenses to the crime and all
defects in the proceedings that are not jurisdictional. 2 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine
Criminal Practice, § 11.7; § 37.10 (Rev. Ed., Issue 3,1995).
For all the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the appeal is without
merit. Therefore, the entry shall be
Appeal Denied. The defendant shall have a stay of execution to allow him to
appeal to the Law Court within the time limits for filing an appeal.

3

Date: August 13,1997.
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STATE OF MAINE
Cumberland, ss

SUPERIOR COURT
CRIMINAL ACTION
'DOCKET NO. CR- 97-388 '

STATE OF MAINE
V

Hi

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

TERRANCE BRENNAN

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter was instituted when the Department of the
Attorney‘General filed a criminal complaint ■charging■the
defendant/appellant (hereinafter appellant) with the Class E
crime of the unauthorized practice of law in violation of
4 M.R.S.A. §807. The complaint1 was'filed in the Portland
District Court on September 12, 1996.
Arraignment of the
appellant was subsequently scheduled for October 8, 1996 but
instead, appellant appeared before the District Court on October
4 , 1 996 and was arraigned at that time, pleading not guilty.
On November8, 1996, admittedly beyond the twenty-one day time
limit, appellant filed a jury trial request.
Approximately
two weeks later, appellant received the jury request back in
the mail along with an attached, unsigned "post-it" note stating
"Pis. be advised that your request for Jury Trial is being
returnwed beyond the 21 day rule as highlighted." See
attachment 1 to Affidavit of Terrance Brennan.
Trial in the matter was initially scheduled for November
25, 1996 but upon motion by the appellant on November 18, 1996
(AAG Kathleen Robert's initial objection having been withdrawn),
the trial was rescheduled for January 13, 1997. On that date,
the appellant pleaded guilty to the charge.
He was sentenced
to six months in jail, all but thirty days suspended, and one
year of probation.
Appellant requested and was granted a twenty day stay of
execution in order to file an appeal.
On February 3, 1997
appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and a transcript
request.
MATERIAL FACTS
Appellant raises only one issue on appeal, that being the
denial of his right to a trial by jury.
At his arraignment,
appellant was not informed of the necessity of making the request
within twenty-one days. Transcript at 2-3..

ARGUMENT OF LAW
Article O n e , Section Six of the Maine Constitution
guarantees the accused in a criminal matter of the right to
a trial by jury. Rule 22(a) of the Maine Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that a defendant desiring a jury trial must
make such a demand within twenty-one days of his arraignment
or he "shall be deemed to have waived the right to trial by
jury." I d , However, the Law Court has stated:
It is well settled that, in order to be effective,
the waiver of the constitutional right to trial
by jury must be made "voluntarily and
intelligently."... First, even if [the defendant]
was present to hear all of the mass instruction
[given at the commencement of the arraignment
proceedings to all defendants there present], the
presiding judge's statement ... about criminal
defendants' right to a jury trial failed to drive
home to his hearers the necessity of making a demand
for a jury trial within 21 days and the waiver
consequence of failing to do so.
Second, the mass instruction to an unidentified
group present in the courtroom by itself is not
enough to discharge the obligation of Rule 5 (b)
and to justify an inference of a voluntary and
intelligent waiver under Rule 40(a).
The right
to a jury belongs to the individual defendant; only
he, after being fully advised, can be considered
to have waived it by doing nothing for 21 days.
It is incumbent upon District Court judges in
conducting arraignments to take affirmative steps
reasonably designed to make each defendant himself
aware of his individual right to a jury trial and
of the demand that he must make within 21 days if
he is to avoid a binding inference of waiver.
State
v. Rowell, 468 A.2d 1005, 1007-1008 (Me. 1983)
(citing State v, Boilard, 359 A.2d 65, 68 (Me. 1976).
Furthermore, the Rowell Court stated in a footnote "We do not
mean to suggest that a mass instruction may not be used as a
proper part of the process required by Rule 5(b).
Standing
alone, however, it is inadequate to establish that an individual
defendant understood it, or even heard it." I d . at n. 3, 1007.
Finally, in State v. Lenfestey, 557 A2d. 1327 (Me. 1989 ), the
Court upheld the inference of waiver, but only after finding
that, in addition to the mass instruction, "Then, in accordance
with the procedure required by State v . Rowell
the judge
questioned Lenfestey individually to make .sure she understood
the consequences of failing to make an affirmative demand for
a jury trial within 21 days." I d . at 1328 (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION
Because the presiding judge at appellant's arraignment
failed to give the appellant any individual instructions
regarding his rights and also failed to question appellant in
order to ascertain whether he understood his rights, appellant's
conviction must be overturned.
Respectfully submitted on this thirtieth day of May, 1997.

Pro-se

STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND,, ss.
ss.

M i l

1997

SUPERIOR COURT.
CRIMINAL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CR-97-388

STATE OF MAINE
"APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
v
TERRANCE BRENNAN

)

NOW COMES THE APPELANT, pro se, and replies to the State's Brief
as follows:
I.
Contrary to the assertion set forth by the State,
Defendant/Appellant signed his Notice of Appeal at the same
time he signed his Request for Transcript.
The State's "most basic" reason why the Court need not
reach the merits of the Appellant's appeal is the State's claim
that the Appellant failed to sign his Notice of Appeal.
A simple
review of the District Court file will suffice to convince
the presiding justice of the Superior Court that the State's
argument on this point is spurious.
First, the Court should
take notice that Apellant submitted his Notic of Appeal using
the form which appears in the "Maine Rules of Court".
Appellant signed the bottom line of that form before filing
that form with the Court.
Form 12 includes both the Notice
of Appeal and Transcript Order.
Appellant submitted a timely
Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court and, attached thereto
and signed, a Transcript Order.
The entire filing was done
on one page.
Therefore, the Appellant has fulfilled his
responsibility pursuant to M.R. Civ.P. 11.
FURTHERMORE, the form provided to Appellant by the District
Court Clerk provides no space for a signature.
In fact, the
only reason that the District Court Clerk provided the Appelant
with the form is that the form submitted by the Appellant on
February 3, 1997 did not conform to the District Court's form.
M.R.Civ.P. 11 , upon which the State relies, states that "Every
pleading and motion. .. shall be signed...
The form filed
by Appellant on February 3, 1 996 does not qualify as either
a Motion or a Pleading. See M.R.Civ. P. 7(a), 7(b).
In point
of fact, the document filed by appellant is a "notice" and as
such requires no signature, at least no signature pursuant to
M.R.Civ.P. 11. Nevertheless, the Appellant signed the document
which is listed as Form 12 of the District Court Forms of
Criminal Procedure.

II.

Appellant has provided this Court with the only transcript

and also the only information which is relevant to his appeal.
The State would have this Court believe that the Appellant has
willfully failed to provide the Court with relevant material
in the form of transcripts.
Appellant points out that the only
issue which he appeals is whether the District Court Judge at
arraignment did or did not properly inform Appellant of his
right to a jury trial.
Given the cases cited by Appellant in
his Brief, it should be apparent that the only relevant issue
is whether the judge at arraignment personnally informed the
Appellant of his right to a jury trial and specifically informed
him of the steps which he should follow in order to demand same.
In both State v. Rowell, 486 A . 2d 1005 (Me. 1983) and State
v, Lenfesty, 557 A.2d 1 327 (Me. 1989), the Law Court clearly
held that such a personnal and specific instruction must be
given before a defendant can be deemed to have waived his right
to a jury.
Thus, the only relevant portion of the transcript
of the arraignment proceeding is that which relates to the
intercourse between the Court and the arraignee. The mass
instructions given at the outset of the arraignment proceedings
is not relevant, nor, by any stretch, could the transcript (or
an agreed-to statement) of the Appellant's guilty plea and the
subsequent sentencing hearing be considered relevant. The State's
reliance on State v. R o s s , 691 A.2d 1253 (Me. 1997) and State
v. Thwing, 487 A.2d 260 (Me. 1985) is misplaced, in that, in
each of those cases, the Appellant failed to provide the
reviewing court with relevant information.
In Ross , no
transcript was provided. In Thw i n g , the Court stated "An
appellant has the burden of supplying this Court with a record
adequate to permit a fair consideration of the issues presented
for review." Id. at 262.
In the instant case, the Appellant
has done s o .
As a final point, the Appellant would point out that, should
the Court accept the State's argument, it would in effect be
saying that it is incumbent upon a party appealing to anticipate
every argument which the opposing party may conceivably m a k e ,
and to then go to the expense of providing a transcript to cover
such contingency.

III.
The Appellant preserved the issue of the irregularity
at the arraignment hearing by filing with the District Court
a request for jury trial.
Perhaps the easiest argument of the State to address is that
the Appellant waived any claim to irregularities at the
arraignment hearing bu failing to raise such claim at his plea
hearing.
The very fact that the Appellant filed with the
District Court a request for a jury trial and was denied (albeit,
apparently, by a member of the clerical staff) preserves the
issue for this Court's review.
The State cannot at this point
deny that the Appellant did in fact file such a jury requesrt
insofar as the State relies on that request and Appellant's

Affidavit swearing to the accuracy of that request and the
unsigned note attached thereto in its Argument 4. In addition,
both the Judge who accepted the guilty plea and the Assistnt
Attorney General (Kathleen A. Roberts) were aware that Appellant
intended to appeal the denial of the right to a jury trial.
Judge Bradley granted, without objection from AAG Roberts, the
Appellant's motion for stay of execution speciffically so that
Appellant would have twenty days to appeal.
If necessary, AAG
Roberts could be called to verify this point.

I V .The State's Argument on the merits of Appellant"s appeal
is without merit, and Appellant stands on his original Brief
as to the failure by the arraignment judge to properly instruct
Appellant as to the procedures necessary to secure his right
to a jury trial.

CONCLUSION
For the Foregoing reasons, the Court should overturn the
conviction of Apellant and remand this matter to the District
Court so that Appellant can properly assert his right to a jury
trial.
A
rennan
pro se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Terrance J. Brennan, hereby certify that on this date, July
10, 1997 I caused to be served upon Assistant Attorney General
Donald Macomber Appellant's Reply Brief in the matter of State
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placing same in the United States Mail.
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rennan

STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CRIMINAL ACTION \
DOCKET NO. CR-97-388

STATE OF MAINE,
Appellee

STATE OF MAiNc
ss, Clerk's u
SUPERIOR COURT

ìberland,

JUN 2 6 1997

v.

RECEIVED
TERRANCE BRENNAN,
Appellant

ON APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

ANDREW KETTERER
Attorney General
KATHLEEN A. ROBERTS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State at Plea

CHARLES K, LEADBETTER
Assistant Attorney General
Of Counsel

DONALD W. MACOMBER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State on Appeal
6 State House
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 626-8800

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
STATEMENT OF THE CASE...............................................................................

1

ARGUMENT................................................................ ........................ ..................

3

1.

The Defendants failure to sign his notice of appeal before the
expiration of the deadline for filing the notice of appeal may
have deprived this court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 3

2.

The Defendant's failure to provide this Court with all pertinent
transcripts makes this claim unreviewable.
4

3.

Defendant's Tanuarv 13,1997 guilty plea waived any claim that
there were irregularities in the October 4.1996 arraignment
proceeding.

4.

5

Even if the issue had not been waived, the Defendant's claim is
without merit because he was made aware of his right to request
a jury trial and of his responsibility to assert that right within
21 days of his arraignment.
6

CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................

9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.............................................. ....................................

10

ADDENDUM A
ADDENDUM B

STATEMENT OF THE CASH
On September 17, 1996, a criminal complaint was filed in the District Court
located at Portland which charged the Defendant, Terrance Brennan, with one count
of Class E unauthorized practice of law in violation of 4 M.R.S.A. § 807 (Supp. 1996).
(D.R. l)i
On October 4, 1996, the Defendant appeared without counsel, was arraigned
and entered a plea of not guilty to the complaint (Bradley, J., presiding). (D.R. 1)2
Although not reflected in the portion of the arraignment transcript provided to this
court by the Defendant, the Defendant was apparently provided with a copy of Form
7 from the Appendix of District Court Forms, which specifically informed the
Defendant of his right to demand a jury trial within 21 days of his arraignment. (See
Affadavit [sic] of Terrance Brennan and Attachment 1) On November 8, 1996, the
Defendant filed his Form 7 request for a jury trial, which was returned to him as
untimely filed. Id.
On January 13,1997, the Defendant appeared without counsel and changed
his previously-entered plea to guilty. (D.R. 1)3 Judge Bradley accepted the

i References to the District Court Docket Record, a copy of which is attached to
this brief as Addendum A, shall be as follows: (D.R.__ ).
2The Defendant has failed to provide this Court with a transcript of the entire
arraignment proceeding before Judge Bradley, including the mass instruction
usually provided at the beginning of every arraignment session in the District
Court. Rather, the Defendant only requested the portion of the electronically
recorded proceedings in which Judge Bradley specifically addressed his case.
3The Defendant failed to request that this proceeding be electronically
recorded. Accordingly, there is no transcript of the Defendant's change of
plea/sentencing proceeding.

-2Defendant's change of plea and sentenced the Defendant to a six (6) month term of
imprisonment in the custody of the Cumberland County Jail with all but 30 days
suspended/ followed by a one year period of probation with special conditions that
the Defendant refrain from the possession or use of alcohol and undergo alcohol
counseling/treatment to the satisfaction of his probation officer. (D.R. 1) Judge
Bradley granted the Defendant a stay of execution of his sentence until February 4,
1997. (D.R. 1)
On February 3/1997, the Defendant filed an unsigned notice of appeal to the
Superior Court pursuant to Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 36(a). (D.R. 1) That
same date, the Defendant also filed motions to continue the stay of execution of his
sentence and to continue personal recognizance bail/ both of which Judge Bradley
granted that same date. (D.R, 1) On February 13/1997, the notice of appeal was
returned to the Defendant because of his failure to sign it. (D.R. 1) The Defendant
signed a new notice of appeal on February 22, 1997, which was received by the
District Court Clerk's Office on February 25/1997.44

4This new notice of appeal is not mentioned in the District Court Docket
Record which has been provided to this court. The State is attaching a copy of this
new notice of appeal to this brief as Addendum B. Additionally/ the State is
requesting that the District Court forward a corrected copy of the Docket Record to be
included in the formal record on appeal.

-3ARGUMENT
The sole issue raised in this appeal by the Defendant is whether the District
Court erred by failing to specifically inform him at his arraignment of his State
constitutional right to a trial by jury under Article I § 6 and of his duty under
M.R.Crim.P. 22 to assert that right within 21 days of the arraignment. For several
reasons, however, this court need not reach the merits of this claim. Even if this
court were to reach the merits, the claim is without merit.
X.

The Defendants failure to sign his notice of appeal before the
expiration of the deadline for filing the notice of appeal may have
deprived this court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

The most basic reason why the court need not reach the merits of this appeal
is the court may not have jurisdiction. The Defendant failed to sign the notice of
appeal he filed with the Clerk of the District Court on February 3,1997, the last day of
his 20 day period to file the notice. M.R.Crim.P. 36(a). Form 12 of the Appendix of
District Court Forms, governing the notice of appeal to the Superior Court,
contemplates that the pleading must be signed. M.R.Crim.P. 49(d), which governs
filing requirements in criminal actions, provides in pertinent part, "'papers shall be
filed in the manner provided in civil actions." M.R.Civ.P, 11 provides in pertinent
part:
Every pleading and motion of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record
in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be
stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign the party's pleading or motion and state the party's
address. . . . If a pleading or motion is not signed, it shall
not be accepted for filing.

-4Indeed, the notice of appeal filed by the Defendant on February 3, 1997 was
returned to him by the Clerk of Courts because it was not signed. (D.R. 1) The
deadline for filing a properly executed notice of appeal is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. McKenzie v. Maine Employment Security Com'n, 453 A.2d 505/509
(Me. 1982). Since a properly signed notice of appeal was not filed with the Clerk
within 20 days of the entry of the judgment of conviction/ this Court may be
without jurisdiction to entertain the Defendant's appeal. State v. Pelletier. 636 A.2d
989 (Me. 1994); State v. Mower. 254 A,2d 604/ 605 (Me. 1969); 2 Cluchey & Seitzinger/
Maine Criminal Practice § 37.4 at VII-60 (Rev.Ed. Issue 3 1995).

2.

The Defendant's failure to provide this Court with all pertinent
transcripts makes this claim unreviewable.

The Defendant did not order a transcript of the mass instruction portion of
the October 4, 1996 arraignment proceeding before Judge Bradley. Rather, he only
ordered the portion of the transcript of the proceeding during which Judge Bradley
was specifically addressing him. Without the transcript of the mass instruction, this
court has no way of knowing whether Judge Bradley informed all assembled
arraignees of their State constitutional right to a jury trial and their concomitant
obligation to assert this right within 21 days, or be deemed to have waived it.
Additionally, the Defendant did not take the appropriate steps to ensure that
his January 13, 1997 change of plea/sentencing proceeding was electronically
recorded. Accordingly, no transcript of that proceeding exists. Furthermore,

-5Defendant failed to take the steps required by M.R.Crim.P. 36A(d) and (e)(1),
pertaining to a settled statement of what transpired at the January 13, 1997
plea/sentencing proceeding in lieu of a transcript. Thus, this court has no way of
determining whether the Defendant attempted to raise this State constitutional
claim before the trial court.5
A defendant's failure to produce all relevant transcripts to the reviewing
court renders the merits of the defendant's arguments unreviewable, necessitating
an affirmance of the judgment of conviction. State v. Ross. 1997 ME 6 7 ,1 1, 691 A.2d
1253,1254 (Apr. 4,1997); State v. Thwing. 487 A.2d 260, 262 (Me. 1985).

3.

Defendant's Tanuarv 13,1997 guilty plea waived any claim that there
were irregularities in the October 4,1996 arraignment proceeding.

' The Defendant is foreclosed from raising a claim on direct appeal alleging
irregularities with his arraignment because he plead guilty. A guilty plea waives all
appealable issues except those related to jurisdiction. State v. Small. 381 A.2d 1130,
1132 (Me. 1978); State v. Vane. 322 A.2d 58, 62 (Me. 1974); Dow v. State. 275 A,2d 815,
821 (Me. 1971); 1 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice. § 11.7 at IV-33 (Rev.
Ed. Issue 3 1995).
The Defendant may be asserting that he entered his plea conditionally
pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). The record is devoid of any reference to this

5Even constitutional claims must be raised before the trial court in the first
instance to be properly preserved for appeal. Berg v. Bragdon, 1997 ME 1 2 9 ,1 9 ,__
A .2d__ (June 6,1997); Wright v. Saco School Dep't, 610 A.2d 257, 258 (Me. 1992).

-6subsection, however, and none of the prerequisites for a proper conditional guilty
plea, i.e. approval of the court and consent of the attorney for the State, have been
met.

4.

Even if the issue had not been waived, the Defendant's claim is
without merit because he was made aware of his right to request a jury
trial and of his responsibility to assert that right within 21 days of his
arraignment.

The Defendant's unpreserved^ appellate claim that the District Court erred by
not specifically informing him of his State constitutional right to a jury trial7 is
belied by Attachment 1 to his Affidavit filed with this court along with his brief —
Form 7 from the Appendix of District Court Forms, Notice of Right to Transfer for
Jury Trial; Jury Trial Request, which specifically states " You have a right to a jury
trial on the criminal charge against you. If you want a jury trial, you must fill out
this form and turn it in at the District Court Clerk's Office . . . within 21 days after the
date of your arraignment." Although the partial transcript provided to this court of
the arraignment proceeding does not reveal whether the Defendant received this
form at that time, there is no disputing that he did receive the form at some point,

¿Since the Defendant failed to raise this issue below, this court can only
consider this appellate claim for obvious error. M.R.Crim.P. 52(b).
. TArticle I section 6 of the Maine Constitution provides in pertinent part/'In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to . . .have a speedy, public
and impartial trial, and except in trials by martial law or impeachment, by a jury of
the vicinity." This provision extends to all criminal-offenses in Maine regardless of
classification. State v. Sklar, 317 A,2d 160 (Me. 1974).

-7because he filed it with the District Court Clerk's Office, albeit two weeks after the
deadline.
Under the terms of Rule 22(a), a defendant charged with a
Class D or Class E crime in District Court must demand a
jury trial within 21 days of arraignment or the right is
waived. Waiver of jury trial for Class D and Class E
offenses in the District Court is now handled by the use of
Form 7 of the Appendix of District Court Forms. This
form advises a defendant of the defendant's right to
transfer the case for a jury trial in Superior Court and
provides a space in which a defendant can request a jury
trial. If a defendant or the defendant's attorney does not
execute this form or otherwise convey to the court the
defendant's request for a jury trial within the 21-day
period, the defendant's right to jury trial is deemed
waived. . . . Maine courts have found the approach of
Rule 22(a) to be acceptable.
1 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 23.4 at V-38 & V-39 (Rev.Ed. Issue
3 1995); State v. Lenfestv, 557 A.2d 1327, 1328 (Me. 1989); State v. Rowell. 468 A.2d
1005,1007 (Me. 1983).
The Defendant's reliance on State v, Rowell, 468 A.2d 1005 (Me, 1983) is
misplaced. In RowelL the Law Court merely held that the mass instruction to all the
assembled arraignees was insufficient by itself to inform the defendant of his
constitutional right to a jury trial and of the necessity of asserting the right within 21
days of his arraignment. Id. at 1007-1008. Presumably in this case the District Court
informed the assembled arraignees of this right and obligation in the mass
instruction since such an instruction is required by M.R.Crim.P. 5A(b); since the
Defendant has failed to provide a transcript of the mass instruction, we can only
presume this was done. Unlike in RowelL however, the Defendant was also

-8provided with a personal copy of District Court Form 7 (last revised in June 1990)
which explicitly informed him of his right to a jury trial and of his obligation to
assert that right no later than 21 days after his arraignment. The Defendant simply
failed to timely assert his right.
In summary, if this court should get to the merits of this appeal, the District
Court committed no error, much less obvious error, with respect to the Defendant's
right to a jury trial.

-9CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

DATED: June

1997
DONALD W. MACOMBER
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
6 State House
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 626-8800
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Portland, Maine 04102
zs7^
Dated at Augusta, Maine this__ day of June, 1997.
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DECISION AND ORDER
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bhc e ived
TERRANCE BRENNAN,
Appellant
This matter comes before the court on the appeal of Terrance Brennan from a
judgment of the District Court where he had entered a plea of guilty to a charge of
unauthorized practice of law, Class E, in violation of 4 M.R.S.A. § 807. The appellant
had been disbarred from the practice of law on December 26,1995. The record reflects
that he signed a waiver of his right to counsel on January 13,1997 and entered a plea
of guilty. He was sentenced to six months with all but 30 days suspended and
probation for a period of one year. The transcript of the District Court arraignment
on October 4, 1996, reflects that the appellant entered a plea of not guilty but the
records do not include the court's explanation of rights to those appearing for
arraignment, including the right to a jury trial where the charge could carry a jail
sentence. The defendant did not file a transcript of the "mass arraignment" of
October 4,1996, nor did he file a transcript of proceedings of January 13.1997.
The appellant contends on appeal that the failure of the court to advise him
of his right to a jury trial requires the setting aside of the conviction. He contends

1

that the "mass arraignment" is not adequate to inform him of his right to a jury trial
and, at oral argument, stated that he was not in the court room when the "mass
arraignment" instructions were given. The State contends that the appeal must fail
because the appellant did not furnish a complete record for appellate review,
including the transcript of the "mass arraignment", that the appeal is not timely
since he had not signed the notice of appeal within the time for taking an appeal,
and that his right of appeal has been waived by his plea of guilty.

DISCUSSION

The court does not have a transcript of the January 13, 1997 hearing when the
guilty plea was entered. The court has no way of determining whether he was
informed of his right to a jury trial. The court does not have a transcript of the
District Court's explanation of rights to all persons in court at the arraignment on
October 4, 1996, and therefore has no way of determining whether those present
were informed of their right to a jury trial. The failure to produce all relevant
transcripts for appellate review requires denial of an appeal. State v. Ross, 1997 ME
67 1, 691 A.2d 1253,1254 (Apr.4,1997); State v. Thwing. 487 A.2d 260, 262 (Me. 1985)
A notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. M.R.Crim.P. 49(d);
M,R.Civ.P. 11, The signed notice of appeal must be filed within 20 days of the entry
of judgment. The record in this case reflects that the unsigned notice of appeal of the
appellant was filed February 3, 1997, the defendant was notified that the notice of

2

J

appeal had to be signed, and the signed notice was not filed until February 13, 1997.
A criminal defendant has 20 days after entry of judgment within which to file a
notice of appeal. M.R.Crim. P. 37(c). Failure to meet the deadline is fatal to the
authority of the court to hear the appeal. State v. Pelletier. 636 A.2d 989, 99(Mel994).
The appellant's affidavit dated June 2, 1997, filed with the court June 3, 1997,
contains as an attachment a document (DCCR-28 (6/90) C) which is a District Court
form advising persons about court procedure and contains a jury trial request It is
dated November 8, 1996, is signed by the appellant and contains a notation in the
lower right corner to the appellant "Please be advised that your request for jury trial
is being returned beyond the 21 day rule as highlighted." This court can infer from
this document that the appellant had received a notice of his rights at the time of his
arraignment and that he had not filed his request for jury trial within 21 days of his
arraignment.
The right to challenge a guilty plea on direct appeal is limited.

State v.

Blanchard, 409 A.2d 229, 232 n. 1 (Me. 1979). The rationale for this principle is that by
voluntarily pleading guilty, a defendant waives all defenses to the crime and all
defects in the proceedings that are not jurisdictional. 2 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine
Criminal Practice, § 11.7; § 37.10 (Rev. Ed., Issue 3,1995).
For all the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the appeal is without
merit. Therefore, the entry shall be
Appeal Denied. The defendant shall have a stay of execution to allow him to
appeal to the Law Court within the time limits for filing an appeal.

3

Date: August 13, 1997.
Carl O. jßrddford
Justice, Superi
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STATE OF MAINE

Cumberland

SUPERIOR COURT
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STATE OF MAINE
S T A T E M E N T O F T R A N S M IS S IO N OF
E X H IB IT S TO LAW C O U R T

us.

Terrance Brennan

EXHIBITS in the above Case consist of the following: (If none, so state)
NONE

Above Exhibits Retained in This Office
Above Exhibits Transmitted to Law Court

□
□

Dated:__________ Oct. 10. 1997

C ounty
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V

Cumberland, ss
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SUPERIOR COURT
CRIMINAL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CR- 97-388
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STATE OF MAINE
V

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO
THE LAW COURT
(M.R.CRIM.P. 37)

TERRANCE BRENNAN

Notice is hereby given that Terrance J. Brennan, who is
the Defendant in this proceeding, hereby appeals to the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine, sitting as the Law Court, from the
judgment entered in this proceeding on the 13th day of August,
1997. The Defendant has also filed a Motion for Enlargement
of Time in which to file this Notice of Appeal based on excusable
neglect.
The Defendant is at present not in custody.
is 757 Brighton Avenue, Portland, Mair

His address

n

r

\

\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I,

Terrance J. Brennan, hereby certify that on this date, October
3, 1997 I caused to be served upon Assistant Attorney General
Donald Macomber Appellant's Notice of Appeal and Motion for
Enlargement of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal by placing
same in the United States Mail.
.
f\ g
Dated : a

i ? n

rennan

i
^

INE

Cumberland, ss

CCT -h P b 32

SUPERIOR COURT
CRIMINAL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CR-97-388

/

OF MAINE

MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF
TIME IN WHICH TO FILE NOTICE
OF APPEAL

V.

TERRANCE BRENNAN

/
1

\
NOW COMES the appellant, Terrance Brennan, and states the
following:

1

V

M \
^
4

2. On September 8, 1997, not having heard anything from the
Superior Court regarding the above-captioned matter, I contacted
the Court and for the first time learned that Justice Bradford
had indeed handed down a decision and that my appeal had been
denied;

\

«
N
Q

1.
I am the defendant/appellant in the above-captioned matter
and as such I received no Notice from tne Superior Court Clerk's
Off ice of the Decision and Order rendered By Justice Bradford
regarding a hearing held on August 12,1997, which Decision
and Order were apparently filed on August 13,, 1997, until
September 12, 1997;

V

\

Y *

3.
I immediately contacted Assistant Attorney General Donald
■Macomber, the most recent State's attorney on this case, and
he informed me that he had also never received any notice of
Justice Bradford's decision and that "of course" he had no
objection to an enlargement of time in which I could file a
notice of appeal.
Mr. Macomber also understood that I would
be unable to even determine if a notice of appeal would be
warranted unless and until I received a copy of Justice
Bradford's Decision and Order; I received the requested document
on September 11, 1997;
4.
I also contacted the Cumberland County Superior Court Clerk's
Office and inquired as to why neither Mr. Macomber nor myself
had been informd of the ruling by Justice Bradford, and the
best and only response I received was that the person who usually
handles such matters was out of the office for the week.
WHEREFORE, the appellant requests that the Court find that
excusable neglect exists in that the appellant did not file
his Notice of Appeal within twenty days due to errors made by
the Court's clerk's Office and grant the appellant additional
time pursuant to M.R.Crim. P . 37(c).

Ô c-kA
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June 25, 1997
Deborah Hjort/ Clerk
Superior Court at Cumberland County
Cumberland Comity Courthouse
P.O. Box 287
Portland/ Maine 04112
RE: State of Maine v. Terrance Brennan/ CR-97-388
Dear Ms. Hjort:
Please enter my appearance as counsel for the State of Maine in this matter.
Enclosed for filing is the "Brief of the Appellee/ State of Maine." In the State's view,
^this matter can be decided on the briefs without oral argument. Unless the pro-se
. -^Defendant indicates that oral argument is necessary/ this matter can be presented to
the presiding justice at your earliest convenience.
Thank you for your assistance.

DONALD W. MACOMBER
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
cc: Terrance Brennan
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STATEMENT OF THE CASH
On September 17, 1996, a criminal complaint was filed in the District Court
located at Portland which charged the Defendant, Terrance Brennan, with one count
of Class E unauthorized practice of law in violation of 4 M.R.S.A. § 807 (Supp. 1996).
(D.R. 1)1
On October 4, 1996, the Defendant appeared without counsel, was arraigned
and entered a plea of not guilty to the complaint (Bradley, J., presiding). (D.R. 1)2
Although not reflected in the portion of the arraignment transcript provided to this
court by the Defendant, the Defendant was apparently provided with a copy of Form
7 from the Appendix of District Court Forms, which specifically informed the
Defendant of his right to demand a jury trial within 21 days of his arraignment. (See
Affadavit [sic] of Terrance Brennan and Attachment 1) On November 8, 1996, the
Defendant filed his Form 7 request for a jury trial, which was returned to him as
untimely filed. Id.
On January 13, 1997, the Defendant appeared without counsel and changed
'i’

his.'previously-entered plea to guilty. (D.R. 1)3 Judge Bradley accepted the
\
References to the District Court Docket Record, a copy of which is attached to
this brief as Addendum A, shall be as follows: (D.R.__ ).
2The Defendant has failed to provide this Court with a transcript of the entire
arraignment proceeding before Judge Bradley, including the mass instruction
usually provided at the beginning of every arraignment session in the District
Court. Rather, the Defendant only requested the portion of the electronically
recorded proceedings in which Judge Bradley specifically addressed his case.
3Xhe Defendant failed to request that this proceeding be electronically
recorded. Accordingly, there is no transcript of the Defendants change of
plea/sentencing proceeding.

-2Defend ant's change of plea and sentenced the Defendant to a six (6) month term of
imprisonment in the custody of the Cumberland County Jail with all but 30 days
suspended, followed by a one year period of probation with special conditions that
the Defendant refrain from the possession or use of alcohol and undergo alcohol
counseling/treatment to the satisfaction of his probation officer. (D.R. 1) Judge
Bradley granted the Defendant a stay of execution of his sentence until February 4,
1997. (D.R. 1)
On February 3,1997, the Defendant filed an unsigned notice of appeal to the
Superior Court pursuant to Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 36(a). (D.R. 1) That
same date, the Defendant also filed motions to continue the stay of execution of his
sentence and to continue personal recognizance bail, both of which Judge Bradley
•
granted that same date. (D.R. 1) On February 13,1997, the notice of appeal was
.returned to the Defendant because of his failure to sign it. (D.R. 1) The Defendant
signed a new notice of appeal on February 22,1997, which was received by the
V
Disjtrict Court Clerk's Office on February 2 5 ,1997.4

\

4This new notice of appeal is not mentioned in the District Court Docket
Record which has been provided to this court. The State is attaching a copy of this
new notice of appeal to this brief as Addendum B. Additionally, the State is
requesting that the District Court forward a corrected copy of the Docket Record to be
included in the formal record on appeal.

-3ARGUMENT
The sole issue raised in this appeal by the Defendant is whether the District
Court erred by failing to specifically inform him at his arraignment of his State
constitutional right to a trial by jury under Article I § 6 and of his duty under
M.R.Crim.P. 22 to assert that right within 21 days of the arraignment. For several
reasons, however, this court need not reach the merits of this claim. Even if this
court were to reach the merits, the claim is without merit.
1.

The Defendant's failure to sign his notice of appeal before the
expiration of the deadline for filing the notice of appeal may have
deprived this court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

The most basic reason why the court need not reach the merits of this appeal
is the court may not have jurisdiction. The Defendant failed to sign the notice of
T
%>peal he filed with the Clerk of the District Court on February 3,1997, the last day of
his 20 day period to file the notice. M.R.Crim.P. 36(a). Form 12 of the Appendix of
District Court Forms, governing the notice of appeal to the Superior Court,
>■

contemplates that the pleading must be signed. M.R.Crim.P. 49(d), which governs
filing requirements in criminal actions, provides in pertinent part, "papers shall be
filed in the manner provided in civil actions." M.R.Civ.P. 11 provides in pertinent
part:
Every pleading and motion of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record
in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be
stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign the party's pleading or motion and state the party's
address, . . . If a pleading or motion is not signed, it shall
not be accepted for filing.

-4Indeed, the notice of appeal filed by the Defendant on February 3, 1997 was
returned to him by the Clerk of Courts because it was not signed. (D.R. 1) The
deadline for filing a properly executed notice of appeal is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. McKenzie v. Maine Employment Security Coin/n. 453 A.2d 505, 509
(Me. 1982). Since a properly signed notice of appeal was not filed with the Clerk
within 20 days of the entry of the judgment of conviction, this Court may be
without jurisdiction to entertain the Defendants appeal. State v. Pelletier, 636 A.2d
989 (Me. 1994); State v. Mower. 254 A.2d 604, 605 (Me. 1969); 2 Cluchey & Seitzinger,
x

Maine Criminal Practice § 37.4 at VÍI-60 (Rev.Ed. Issue 3 1995).

7.

The Defendants failure to provide this Court with all pertinent
transcripts makes this claim unreviewable.

*%
The Defendant did not order a transcript of the mass instruction portion of
the October 4, 1996 arraignment proceeding before Judge Bradley. Rather, he only
V

ordered the portion of the transcript of the proceeding during which Judge Bradley
was^'specifically addressing him. Without the transcript of the mass instruction, this
court has no way of knowing whether Judge Bradley informed all assembled
arraignees of their State constitutional right to a jury trial and their concomitant
obligation to assert this right within 21 days, or be deemed to have waived it.
Additionally, the Defendant did not take the appropriate steps to ensure that
his January 13, 1997 change of plea /sentencing proceeding was electronically
recorded. Accordingly, no transcript of that proceeding exists. Furthermore,

-5Defendant failed to take the steps required by M.R.Crim.P. 36A(d) and (e)(1),
pertaining to a settled statement of what transpired at the January 13, 1997
plea/sentencing proceeding in lieu of a transcript. Thus, this court has no way of
determining whether the Defendant attempted to raise this State constitutional
claim before the trial court.5
A defendant's failure to produce all relevant transcripts to the reviewing
court renders the merits of the defendant's arguments unreviewable, necessitating
an affirmance of the judgment of conviction. State v. Ross. 1997 ME 67, 1 1, 691 A.2d
1253, 1254 (Apr. 4,1997); State v. Thwing. 487 A.2d 260, 262 (Me. 1985). '

3.

Defendant's Tanuarv 13,1997 guilty plea waived any claim that there
were irregularities in the October 4,1996 arraignment proceeding.

4
The Defendant is foreclosed from raising a claim on direct appeal alleging
irregularities with his arraignment because he plead guilty. A guilty plea waives all
'X♦

appealable issues except those, related to jurisdiction. State v. Small, 381 A.2d 1130,
1132\Me. 1978); State v. Vane. 322 A.2d 58, 62 (Me. 1974); Dow v. State. 275 A.2d 815,
821 (Me. 1971); 1 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice, § 11.7 at IV-33 (Rev.
Ed. Issue 3 1995).
The Defendant may be asserting that he entered his plea conditionally
pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). The record is devoid of any reference to this

5Even constitutional claims must be raised before the trial court in the first
instance to be properly preserved for appeal. Berg v. Bragdon, 1997 ME 1 2 9 ,1 9 ,__
A .2d__ tfune 6,1997); Wright v. Saco School Dep't. 610 A.2d 257, 258 (Me. 1992). ;

-6subsection, however, and none of the prerequisites for a proper conditional guilty
plea, i.e. approval of the court and consent of the attorney for the State, have been
met.

4.

Even if the issue had not been waived, the Defendant's claim is
without merit because he was made aware of his right to request a jury
trial and of his responsibility to assert that right within 21 days of his
arraignment.

The Defendant's unpreserved6 appellate claim that the District Court erred by
not specifically informing him of his State constitutional right to a jury trial7 is
belied by Attachment 1 to his Affidavit filed with this court along with his brief —
Form 7 from the Appendix of District Court Forms, Notice of Right to Transfer for
. 'Jury Trial; Jury Trial Request, which specifically states " You have a right to a jury
trial on the criminal charge against you. If you want a jury trial, you must fill out
this form and turn it in at the District Court Clerk's Office . . . within 21 days after the
y
date of your arraignment." Although the partial transcript provided to this court of
\
^
>
*
the arraignment proceeding does not reveal whether the Defendant received this
form at that time, there is no disputing that he did receive the form at some point,

6Since the Defendant failed to raise this issue below, this court can only
consider this appellate claim for obvious error. M.R.Crim.P. 52(b).
7Article 1 section 6 of the Maine Constitution provides in pertinent part/Tn
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to . . .have a speedy, public
and impartial trial, and except in trials by martial law or impeachment, by a jury of
the vicinity." This provision extends to all criminal offenses in Maine regardless of
classification. State v. Sklar. 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974).

-7 because he filed it with the District Court Clerk's Office, albeit two weeks after the
deadline.
Under the terms of Rule 22(a), a defendant charged with a
Class D or Class E crime in District Court must demand a
jury trial within 21 days of arraignment or the right is
waived. Waiver of jury trial for Class D and Class E
offenses in the District Court is now handled by the use of
Form 7 of the Appendix of District Court Forms. This
form advises a defendant of the defendant's right to
transfer the case for a jury trial in Superior Court and
provides a space in which a defendant can request a jury
trial. If a defendant or the defendant's attorney does not
execute this form or otherwise convey to the court the
defendant's request for a jury trial within the 21-day
period, the defendant's right to jury trial is deemed
waived. . . . Maine courts have found the approach of
Rule 22(a) to be acceptable.
U Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 23.4 at V-38 & V-39 (Rev.Ed. Issue
3 1995); State v. Lenfestv. 557 A.2d 1327,1328 (Me. 1989); State v. Rowell. 468 A.2d
1005,1007 (Me. 1983).
Y

The Defendant's reliance on State v. Rowell. 468 A.2d 1005 (Me. 1983) is

misplaced. In Rowell, the Law-Court merely held that the mass instruction to all the
assembled arraignees was insufficient by itself to inform the defendant of his
constitutional right to a jury trial and of the necessity of asserting the right within 21
days of his arraignment. Id. at 1007-1008. Presumably in this case the District Court
informed the assembled arraignees of this right and obligation in the mass
instruction since such an instruction is required by M.R.Crim.P. 5A(b); since the
Defendant has failed to provide a transcript of the mass instruction, we can only
presume this was done. Unlike in Rowell, however, the Defendant was also

-8provided with a personal copy of District Court Form 7 (last revised in June 1990)
which explicitly informed him of his right to a jury trial and of his obligation to
assert that right no later than 21 days after his arraignment. The Defendant simply
failed to timely assert his right.
In summary, if this court should get to the merits of this appeal, the District
Court committed no error, much less obvious error, with respect to the Defendant's
right to a jury trial.

4

\

-9CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons/ the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

DATED: June

1997
DONALD W. MACOMBER
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
6 State House
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 626-8800
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Terrance J. Brennan
757 Brighton Ave.
Portland, Maine 04102
July 10, 1997
Ms. Deborah Hjort, Clerk
Cumberland County Superior Court
205 Newbury St,
Portland, Maine
RE; State of Maine v. Terrance Brennan, Docket No. Cr-97~388D
Dear Ms. Hjort:
Enclosed for filing, please find Appellant's Reply Brief.
Also,
please be advised that Appellant Terrance J. Brennan disagrees
with Assistant Attorney General Macomber as to the necessity
of oral argument before a Justice of the Superior Court and
hereby requests that such a hearing be scheduled.
Thank-you for your attention to this matter
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DEPT. OF ATTORNEY GENERA

STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, ss.

STATE OF MAINE
v.

•
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)

SUPERIOR COURT
CRIMINAL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CR-97-388

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

)
TERRANCE BRENNAN

)

NOW COMES THE APPELANT, pro se, and replies to the State's Brief
as follows:
I. Contrary to the assertion set forth by the State,
Defendant/Appellant signed his Notice of Appeal at the same
time he signed his Request for Transcript.
The State's "most basic" reason why the Court need not
reach the merits of the Appellant's appeal is the State's claim
that the Appellant failed to sign his Notice of Appeal. A simple
review of the District Court file will suffice to convince
the presiding justice of the Superior Court that the State's
argument on this point is spurious.
First, the Court should
take notice that Apellant submitted his Notic of Appeal using
the form which appears in the "Maine Rules of Court".
Appellant signed the bottom line of that form before filing
that form with the Court.
Form 12 includes both the Notice
of Appeal and Transcript Order. Appellant submitted a timely
Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court and, attached thereto
and signed, a Transcript Order.
The entire filing was done
on one page. Therefore, the Appellant has fulfilled his
responsibility pursuant to M.R. Civ.P. 11.
FURTHERMORE, the form provided to Appellant by the District
Court Clerk provides no space for a signature.
In fact, the
only reason that the District Court Clerk provided the Appelant
with the form is that the form submitted by the Appellant on
February 3, 1997 did not conform to the District Court's form.
M.R.Civ.P.11, upon which the State relies, states that "Every
pleading and motion...shall be signed... ."
The form filed
by Appellant on February 3, 1996 does not qualify as either
a Motion or a Pleading. See M.R.Civ. P. 7(a), 7(b).
In point
of fact, the document filed by appellant is a "notice" and as
such requires no signature, at least no signature pursuant to
M.R.Civ.P. 11. Nevertheless, the Appellant signed the document
which is listed as Form 12 of the District Court Forms of
Criminal Procedure.

II .

Appellant has provided this Court with the only transcript

and

a lso

the

o n ly

in fo rm atio n

w hich

is

relev an t

to

h is

a p p e a l.

The State would have this Court believe that the Appellant has
willfully failed to provide the Court with relevant material
in the form of transcripts.
Appellant points out that the only
issue which he appeals is whether the District Court Judge at
arraignment did or did not properly inform Appellant of his
right to a jury trial. Given the cases cited by Appellant in
his Brief, it should be apparent that the only relevant issue
is whether the judge at arraignment personnally informed the
Appellant of his right to a jury trial and specifically informed
him of the steps which he should follow in order to demand same.
In both State v. Rowell, 486 A.2d 1005 (Me. 1983) and State
v, Lenfesty, 557 A.2d 1327 (Me. 1989), the Law Court clearly
held that such a personnal and specific instruction must be
given before a defendant can be deemed to have waived his right
to a jury. Thus, the only relevant portion of the transcript
of the arraignment proceeding is that which relates to the
intercourse between the Court and the arraignee.
The mass
instructions given at the outset of the arraignment proceedings
is not relevant, nor, by any stretch, could the transcript (or
an agreed-to statement) of the Appellant's guilty plea and the
subsequent sentencing hearing be considered relevant. The State's
reliance on State v. Ross, 691 A.2d 1253 (Me. 1997) and State
v. Thwing, 487 A.2d 260 (Me. 1.985) is misplaced, in that, in
each of those cases, the Appellant failed to provide the
reviewing court with relevant information.
In Ross , no
transcript was provided. In Thwing, the Court stated "An
appellant has the burden of supplying this Court with a record
adequate to permit a fair consideration of the issues presented
for review." Id. at 262.
In the instant case, the Appellant
has done so.
As a final point, the Appellant would point out that, should
the Court accept the State's argument, it would in effect be
saying that it is incumbent upon a party appealing to anticipate
every argument which the opposing party may conceivably make,
and to then go to the expense of providing a transcript to cover
such contingency.

Ill. The Appellant preserved the issue of the irregularity
at the arraignment hearing by filing with the District Court
a request for jury trial.
Perhaps the easiest argument of the State to address is that
the Appellant waived any claim to irregularities at the
arraignment hearing bu failing to raise such claim at his plea
hearing. The very fact that the Appellant filed with the
District Court a request for a jury trial and was denied (albeit,
apparently, by a member of the clerical staff) preserves the
issue for this Court's review. The State cannot at this point
deny' that the Appellant did in fact file such a jury requesrt
insofar as the State relies on that request and Appellant's

Affidavit swearing to the accuracy of that request and the
unsigned note attached thereto in its Argument 4. In addition,
both the Judge who accepted the guilty plea and the Assistnt
Attorney General (Kathleen A. Roberts) were aware that Appellant
intended to appeal the denial of the right to a jury trial.
Judge Bradley granted, without objection from AAG Roberts, the
Appellant's motion for stay of execution speciffically so that
Appellant would have twenty days to appeal.
If necessary, AAG
Roberts could be called to verify this point.

IV.The State's Argument on the merits of Appellant"s appeal
is without merit, and Appellant stands on his original Brief
as to the failure by the arraignment judge to properly instruct
Appellant as to the procedures necessary to secure his right
to a jury trial.

CONCLUSION
For the Foregoing reasons, the Court should overturn the
conviction of Apellant and remand this matter to the District
Court so that Appellant can properly assert his right to a jury
trial.

pro se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Terrance J. Brennan, hereby certify that on this date, July
10, 1997 I caused to be served upon Assistant Attorney General
Donald Macomber Appellant's Reply Brief in the matter of State
of Maine v, Terrance Brennan, Cumberland County Superior Court.by
placing same in the United States Mail.
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